Understanding how policy design and implementation differ under populist and non-populist governments is complicated by the fact that populism never exists in a pure form and is always attached to a more developed ideology. Leveraging the near-simultaneous election of left-wing populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico and right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, this article analyses populism’s effect on cash transfer programmes. Despite the diametrically opposed ideologies of their presidents, rather than diverging, Mexican and Brazilian cash transfer policies converged under populism. Both leaders rebranded the programmes they inherited and moved policy in an improvised, politicised and clientelistic direction.

This article examines the use of heritage in the context of populism. It is interested in how populists’ division of society in an us-versus-them dichotomy and exclusionary politics intersect with the appeal to the past and the weaponised politicisation of history. More specifically, the analysis focuses on far-right populism’s selective embrace of nostalgia. To this end, we examine heritage politics under the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right populist who ruled Brazil between 2019 and 2022. By surveying government speeches and policies, we developed a typology of the uses of heritage as a form of political power: (1) Heritage as historical revisionism, which has mainstreamed distorted and/or inaccurate history in the official narrative; (2) Heritage as identity repositioning, which has redefined core aspects of Brazil’s identity based on particular understandings of history and tradition; and (3) Heritage as alliance building, which has brought Brazil closer to some countries based on shared narratives and legacies. We find that the selective construction heritage has become an indissociable element of Jair Bolsonaro policies’ quest for domestic and international legitimacy.

Brazil, for many scholars and pundits, showcased the risk of democratic breakdown with the election of a far-right populist like Jair Bolsonaro. Against pessimistic expectations, however, not only has Brazilian democracy survived but politics has returned to business as usual. What can explain this supposedly unanticipated outcome? This article provides an analytical assessment of this this puzzle and offers an alternative explanation. We argue that both the diagnoses of Brazilian institutions and the predictions made were misguided. We explore the role played by the Supreme Court, party system, media, and congressional politics in restricting Bolsonaro’s illiberal initiatives.

Two competing narratives characterize the role of race in Brazil’s 2018 election. Journalists observe that Jair Bolsonaro “entranced” nonwhite voters while “insulting them.” Scholars argue that Bolsonaro politicized race, costing him nonwhite support. In contrast, this article argues that racialized patterns of voter behavior were not distinct from those in recent general elections, and that voters’ electoral choices varied within as well as between racial categories. This study incorporates recent findings on racial subjectivity in Brazil, which emphasize the interaction of racial identification and educational status in shaping racial consciousness. Survey data show that racial differences are driven by highly educated black voters, who are least likely to support Bolsonaro compared to educated white voters and more likely to support leftist candidates. By incorporating findings on racial subjectivity into theoretical predictions and leveraging the 2018 election, this study identifies conditions in which racial identification operates to shape electoral behavior.

Mounting evidence shows that authoritarian orientations exert a powerful influence on public opinion attitudes and candidate support. The 2018 Brazilian elections brought to power Jair Bolsonaro, a candidate with an open disregard for democracy and democratic institutions. This study examines Brazilian voters’ differences in authoritarianism and electoral support for a right-wing authoritarian candidate. It employs the AmericasBarometer national survey data to demonstrate that authoritarianism is politically important in Brazil because of its association with attitudes toward the use of force as well as with conservative social and political attitudes. The effect of authoritarianism on the probability of voting for Bolsonaro is as large as that of other relevant political behavior variables such as ideology, negative partisanship, or religiosity, whereas nonauthoritarian voters spread their votes across other candidates. Although these other variables are also relevant to Bolsonaro’s victory, his candidacy was uniquely able to mobilize a coalition of authoritarian voters. Whether or not authoritarianism remains a salient cleavage in the electorate is considered along with the consequences of this potential divide for political competition in Brazilian politics.