Chapter 16 on Causation explores the challenges of proving causation in an interconnected system like the climate, where multiple actors contribute to the overall impacts. The authors highlight the significance of probabilistic approaches, recognising that establishing direct causation can be challenging due to the nature of climate change and the cumulative nature of greenhouse gas emissions. In their exploration of emerging best practices, the authors underscore the growing recognition among courts of the need for nuanced interpretations of causation requirements in climate litigation. They highlight innovative judicial strategies that utilise scientific evidence and expert testimony to assess the contribution of specific actors to climate impacts, even in the absence of direct causation. They emphasise the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration between legal and scientific experts to navigate the complexities of causation in climate cases. By incorporating and further developing these emerging best practices, courts can facilitate an accurate and fair distribution of responsibilities through the cases they adjudicate.

This final chapter, Chapter 8, offers a summation of the major trends of development seen in the preceding chapters, and addresses the key question of causation, looking at the forces that led to the convergence seen across the Balkan languages. Multilateral, multigenerational, mutual, multilingualism (our “four-M” model) is argued to be the leading element in the convergence, with particular focus on the speaker-plus-dialect approach. An assessment of the construct of “sprachbund” is offered, and it is argued that the Balkan sprachbund is not a remnant of an historical state that no longer exists, but rather is very much alive, albeit in more limited contexts than in the past.

Determining proximate causation is crucial for decisions about legal liability, but how judges select proximate causes is a notoriously disputed issue. Knobe and Shapiro (2020) recently argued that the perceived (ab)normality of causal factors explains both laypeople’s and legal experts’ causal selection patterns. While a large body of psychological research shows that people indeed often select abnormal factors as most important, this research has focused on a very narrow set of scenarios: two simultaneously occurring but independent causes that either conjunctively or disjunctively bring about some outcome. We here explore whether normality also guides causal selection in structures that may be more typical of many legal scenarios: successively occurring causes that are themselves causally connected (causal chains). Comparing effects of both statistical and prescriptive abnormality on causal selection in chains, we only find a tendency to select abnormal causes for manipulations of prescriptive but not statistical normality. Moreover, judgments about the counterfactual relevance of causes or about their suitability as targets of intervention were only moderately correlated with causal selection patterns. The interplay between causal structure and different kinds of (ab)normality in people’s reasoning about proximate causation may thus be more complex than is currently recognized.

This chapter offers an example of conceptual instrumentalist analysis. Being instrumentalist in nature, the analysis focuses on the degree to which one plausible doctrinal design or another best advances the underlying social policies sought to be achieved in a given area of law. Unlike classic empirical analysis, however, the social policies at play in conceptual instrumentalist analysis are not concrete practical benefits that might be furthered in the real world, like greater compensation or deterrence, but are instead more abstract preferred outcomes, like greater fairness or the presence of sufficient fault by a certain party before the imposition of legal liability. Of course, appellate court analysis of any particular legal issue might involve elements of both empirical and conceptual instrumentalist analysis.

The focus of the analysis in this chapter is the tort law requirement of causation. The account presented seeks to explain the structure of this long-standing requirement, the meaning ascribed to the distinction between actual and proximate cause, and the rationale underlying the various exceptions to the main rule that have been developed over time.

A distinction between types of methods (understanding and explanation) that generate different kinds of evidence relevant to the psychiatric assessment is characterised. The distinction is animated with both non-clinical and clinical examples and exercises. Scepticism about the distinction is addressed, and three influential systems of psychiatric knowledge which collapse understanding and explanation in different ways are discussed. The argument is made that the distinction (analogous to the romantic/classic distinction) resurfaces and is compelling. However, another challenge becomes important – holism in psychiatric assessment – which the understanding/explanation distinction leaves in an unsatisfactory state.

This chapter studies how property rights are protected and recognized in common law. In doctrine, substantive rights are not recognized expressly but indirectly. Rights are recognized via doctrines that prohibit wrongs to rights. Common law protects rights in this manner for practical reasons. Courts are better equipped to enforce duties between rights-holders and aggressors than they are to work out the full scope of rights, and when the law prohibits wrongs to rights, it leaves to people the freedom to do whatever does not violate the prohibitions. To secure rights, however, legal duties and prohibitions are structured as seems likely to secure rights. This chapter illustrates nuisance and tort suits over train sparks. Both doctrines secure to owners and occupants rights to use land. The harm, interference, and unreasonability elements of nuisance are structured to secure use rights, and sparks doctrine rules out contributory negligence to secure the same use rights. This way of thinking about rights and wrongs goes against contemporary law and economic scholarship, and this chapter contrasts law and economic studies of rights with the approach developed in this chapter.

Reparations for grand corruption: applies a human rights framework based on the UN Basic Principles on Remedy and Reparations to thinking about reparations for grand corruption on a national level. Under restitution, covers social reuse of confiscated property, and land restitution. Compensation is broken down into categories of damages arising from different corrupt acts, with a focus on loss of opportunity damages. The chapter also considers satisfaction, measures of non-repetition, diffuse harms and issues of causation.

Causal parentage has been a central justification for child support law and for expanding parental rights to couples who conceive with donor gametes, including lesbian couples. Like many famous philosophers, courts insist adults incur parental duties when their voluntary acts create a child who needs care. This causation of peril principle, which is familiar to tort law, does generate personal duties. Unlike a stranger with only a general duty of beneficence, someone who helps create an infant has a special duty to ensure the infant receives care. However, this duty is too weak to ground parenthood. If other willing caregivers are available, casual parents are not obligated to raise the child personally. Nor do they have a right to do so. Someone who creates a perilous situation (a causal parent) cannot object if someone else rescues their victim (the child). Nevertheless, causal parentage may ground limited child support from a political perspective. Many theories of distributive justice are sensitive to causal responsibility. A community may conclude causal parents have a political duty to help meet a child’s needs. Unfortunately, in its haste to privatize child-rearing, American child support law compounds rather than facilitates distributive justice.

This chapter surveys influential ideas about scientific explanation. The idea that scientific explanation is a matter of logical deduction from scientific laws has played an important role both as the basis for positive accounts of scientific explanation and as a target of critical arguments spurring the investigation of alternative views. The chapter reviews some of the reasons in favor holding such a covering-law view of explanation and then turn to some alternatives. The chapter also considers a pragmatically oriented account of the act of explaining. Another alternative focuses on the idea that explanations unify phenomena, showing how seemingly different things are manifestations of a single truth about nature. Several approaches emphasize the way explanations indicate what causes something to happen, whether by reference to a process, a possible manipulation, or a mechanism.

This chapter of the handbook examines the sanctioning doctrines within Anglo-American criminal law and explores similarities and differences between criminal blame and ordinary social blame. The chapter explores the legal notion of actus reus in the context of intended but incomplete transgressive conduct, the distinction between intended and unintended outcomes, as well as questions of recklessness and the role of a transgressor’s character in ordinary and legal blame. It also explores the possibility that a fundamental human motivation to punish those with bad character can influence perceptions of legal questions such as consciousness of risk. Intuitions about the role of moral character in legal blame have produced legal rules restricting the consideration of prior misdeeds. At the same time, these rules and their interpretation ultimately rest on political and moral judgments, rather than psychological insights. The chapter concludes by briefly exploring some remaining questions of criminal law and intuitive blame, such as the role of cultural commitments on motivations to impose legal blame.

As a field of knowledge History is exceptionally interested in the particular and specific rather than the universal and general – it is primarily idiographic rather than nomothetic. It is also centrally concerned with change over time. These two characteristics make History fundamentally a storytelling discipline. Its findings are most often presented in narrative form. Of course, many books do not follow one narrative from cover to cover. But research findings are most often presented as stories – not as reports of particular key results (as, for example, in a scientific lab report) or as the results of statistical analysis. Nomothetic disciplines tend toward examining a relatively narrow set of features of multiple cases in order to create generalizing theories and establish laws of regularity that define what will happen under a given set of circumstances at any and all times and places. History instead usually aims to organize into a coherent interpretation many features of a single case, exploring in detail what happened at a particular time, in a particular place. It often also aims to give us a complex, multifactor causal explanation of why it happened as it did, but usually that causal explanation is embedded in the narrative.

The validity of conclusions drawn from specific research studies must be evaluated in light of the purposes for which the research was undertaken. We distinguish four general types of research: description and point estimation, correlation and prediction, causal inference, and explanation. For causal and explanatory research, internal validity is critical – the extent to which a causal relationship can be inferred from the results of variation in the independent and dependent variables of an experiment. Random assignment is discussed as the key to avoiding threats to internal validity. Internal validity is distinguished from construct validity (the relationship between a theoretical construct and the methods used to operationalize that concept) and external validity (the extent to which the results of a research study can be generalized to other contexts). Construct validity is discussed in terms of multiple operations and discriminant and convergent validity assessment. External validity is discussed in terms of replicability, robustness, and relevance of specific research findings.

Hegel’s “natural philosophy” is an extension of his overall systematic project having to do with a post-Kantian philosophy that did not rely on Kant’s conception of “pure intuitions.” Instead, Hegel proposed a Logic that as an internally self-enclosed system of pure thoughts required to make sense of making sense. Famously, he concluded his Logic with some not entirely clear ideas about the need to move from it to a Naturphilosophie, a move which he somewhat puzzlingly said was not itself a further logical “transition.” Hegel also defends a non-empiricist study of nature, that is, an explanation not merely in terms of empirically determined regularities, for all such regularities, although existent, are not fully “actual” in that they are not what is doing the real work of explanation. What explains the regularities themselves are the various pure objects of the Naturphilosophie which are involved in working out what “external to pure thought” would mean: the mechanical, the physical, the chemical, and the biological fields of nature, each of which manifests a power (Potenz) that explains why the empirically found regularities in nature actually hold. This chapter suggests that the reason for the transition from Logic to Nature is that pure thought on its own is powerless, and that this has implications for how we think of Hegel’s system as a whole.

Literary historians generally explain change by narrating it. Narrative history excels at identifying individual events, authors, and works that exemplify transformations of literary culture. On the other hand, narrative often struggles to represent continuous trends. Since numbers are designed to describe differences of magnitude, quantitative methods can trace a curve and give a more nuanced picture of gradual change. As quantitative methods have become more common in literary studies, it has become clear that many important aspects of literary history are in fact gradual processes extending over relatively long timelines. But there have also, certainly, been moments of rapid change – in some cases initiated by a single book or author. More crucially, readers seem to want the kind of meaning produced by narration. Thus, quantitative methods are never likely to entirely replace a periodized narrative; they merely provide an alternative mode of description.

Epidemiology is about measuring disease or other aspects of health in populations, identifying the causes of ill-health and intervening to improve health, and we come back to these three fundamental components later in the chapter. But what do we mean by ‘health’? Back in 1948, the World Health Organization defined it as ‘… a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being’ (WHO, 1948). In practice, what we usually measure is physical health, and this focus is reflected in the content of most routine reports of health data and in many of the health measures that we will consider here; however, there are now methods to capture the more elusive components of mental and social well-being as well. Importantly, the WHO recognised that it is not longevity per se that we seek, but a long and healthy life. So, instead of simply measuring ‘life expectancy’, WHO introduced the concepts of ‘health-adjusted life expectancy’ (HALE) and subsequently ‘disability-adjusted life years’ (DALYs) to enable better international comparisons of the effectiveness of health systems.

Every civil wrong has a number of requirements that must be satisfied before the plaintiff may obtain compensation for resulting harm. One requirement common to all wrongs is that the harm must be attributable to the defendant’s wrongful conduct. It may broadly be said that the defendant’s wrongful conduct must constitute a cause of the harm. This always involves an inquiry into whether there is a historical link in fact between the wrong and the harm, and usually also a value judgement on whether liability for the harm ought to be imposed upon the defendant.

With regard to wrongs actionable only on proof of damage (for example, negligence), the attribution of responsibility for harm is part of establishing liability rather than a matter of remedy. With regard to wrongs actionable per se, the attribution of responsibility for harm is a matter of remedy since nominal damages can be awarded in the absence of loss. In any event, it is customary to discuss attribution of responsibility in books on remedies, and this book follows that custom.

The search for the causes of disease is an obvious central step in the pursuit of better health through disease prevention. In the previous chapters we looked at how we measure health (or disease) and how we look for associations between exposure and disease. Being able to identify a relation between a potential cause of disease and the disease itself is not enough, though. If our goal is to change practice or policy in order to improve health, then we need to go one step further and decide whether the relation is causal because, if it is not, intervening will have no effect. As in previous chapters, we discuss causation mainly in the context of an exposure causing disease but, as you will see when we come to assessing causation in practice, the concepts apply equally to a consideration of whether a potential preventive measure really does improve health.