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In this chapter, we examine how both variation in levels of judicial independence and in the partisanship of litigants affects citizens’ willingness to punish executives who ignore courts. We again test the partisanship-centered account against our theoretical framework. Leveraging the presence of abstract review in Germany, Poland, and Hungary, we demonstrate that judicial independence continues to be a prerequisite to judicial efficacy, even with the appearance of a discernible influence from partisanship. Our results in this chapter suggest that judicial review holds the promise – at least where courts have high levels of judicial independence – to constrain executives even in contexts where partisanship is heightened.
Does partisanship undermine the ability of courts to affect citizens’ attitudes? We introduce a dueling theoretical account to our own which suggests that citizens prioritize partisanship over constitutional rules when evaluating executive actions. We test these rival perspectives in Germany and the United States with a survey experiment that leverages the countries’ federal structures. We find that citizens of both countries are remarkably steadfast in their willingness to punish executives – including copartisans – for breaching constitutional limits and flouting court orders. Contrary to fears that partisanship is an overwhelmingly pernicious threat to the rule of law, we show that independent courts are resilient in their ability to cut through the binds of partisanship, to monitor executives, and coordinate public actions to reign in incumbent excess.
How do adults form preferences over education policy? Why do Democrats and Republicans disagree about how schools should work and what they should teach? I argue that public opinion follows a “top-down” model, in which rank-and-file voters largely adopt the positions of prominent national leaders in their parties. This causes policy preferences to become polarized. I illustrate these dynamics with four case studies: (1) public opinion toward school reopening during the COVID-19 pandemic; (2) debate about Common Core education standards; (3) voting behavior on a 1978 California initiative that sought to ban gay teachers; and (4) voting behavior on a 1998 California initiative that banned bilingual education in that state.
Partisanship is the primary driver of voter decision-making in the United States. Partisans expect to prefer their party’s candidates’ issue stances and personal characteristics. Even when they learn negative information, motivated reasoning often keeps them from changing their candidate evaluations or vote choice. However, there is a “tipping point” at which partisans will update their priors and may vote against their preferred party’s candidate. This study seeks to determine whether voters are more likely to reach that tipping point when they see a woman in their party, and under what circumstances. We use a unique experimental design to vary a candidate’s gender, congruence with major elements of the party platform, and their participation in a scandal. We find that women are often evaluated more negatively and that subjects rely on substantive information more when evaluating women candidates. Our findings suggest that campaigns and campaign information may matter more for women candidates.
Small business owners play a central role in all advanced economies. Nonetheless, they are an understudied occupational group politically, particularly compared to groups that represent smaller portions of the population (e.g., union members, manufacturing workers). We conduct a detailed investigation of the politics of small business owners and offer new insight into the evolving role of education, class, and occupation in electoral politics. Leveraging diverse sources of data – representative surveys from around the world, campaign finance records, voter files, and a first-of-its-kind, bespoke survey of small business owners – we find consistent evidence that small business owners are more likely to identify with and vote for right-wing parties. We find that this tendency cannot be fully explained by factors that cause people to select into being small business owners. Rather, we identify a key operational channel: the experience of being a small business owner leads people to adopt conservative views on government regulation.
Industrial concentration has increased in recent years with large companies consolidating their dominant positions. Concentrated markets are thought to benefit large firms as they earn elevated profits and gain political influence. Antitrust law is the main policy tool to reduce concentration. Calls to strengthen antitrust have come from the political left and the right, yet we know little about public support for such policies. We test how economic, moral, and democratic concerns influence support for antitrust. We find that the public does not respond to the consumer price benefits of antitrust but is moved by arguments invoking concerns for fairness and the importance of maintaining democratic institutions. We find that Republicans and Democrats often respond in divergent ways, with Republicans being less supportive of antitrust when informed that it could punish successful companies, whereas Democrats are more concerned about using antitrust to curb corporate influence. The findings accord with a general concern on the left for limiting business influence in politics and a concern on the right for maintaining business growth.
Existing academic research has highlighted a connection between dietary habits and political beliefs. An individual’s dietary choices can mean more than just the need or pleasure of eating. Dietary choice can also be tied to a personal identity, in which food consumption reinforces through other beliefs and in-group identities, including partisan affiliation and political ideology. This study analyzes survey data from the Natural Marketing Institute’s (NMI) 2019 Lifestyles of Health and Sustainability (LOHAS) survey and compares the results to Mosier and Rimal’s original evaluation using the NMI’s 2016 LOHAS survey data. The results show most Americans continue to have a meat-based diet irrespective of political party, with gender being the most consistent and robust explanatory factor for dietary choice. However, there are some notable shifts in dietary choice and significance for certain partisan affiliations that highlight how in-group dynamics may be reflective of attitude and behavioral norms.
Despite growing interest in the political consequences of the urban–rural divide, we know little about whether urban and rural populations differ in the policy problems they view as most important. This study explores urban–rural differences in policy priorities over an extended period (1939–2020), using data from 850 U.S. surveys. The analysis reveals modest but persistent gaps between urban and rural residents in several key policy areas. However, while urban–rural differences remain stable across diverse economic and political contexts, partisan affiliation significantly outweighs place-based identities in shaping these priorities. The findings suggest that despite geographic distinctions, urban and rural populations predominantly rely on partisan cues when forming policy agendas, which contributes to a nuanced understanding of political representation.
For decades, the business community has been viewed as a core constituency of the Republican Party. However, several factors, such as corporate prioritization of social values, changes in trade policy, and anti-business sentiment among Republican rank-and-file, suggest a coalitional shift is underway. Scholars have debated whether this shift is an illusion or is real. At the core of this debate is how businesses navigate two forms of organizational conflict: a) stakeholder cross-pressure and b) policy cross-pressure. To measure cross-pressure, we conduct an original survey of elite business leaders. Our evidence suggests a widespread view that companies are increasingly aligned with the Democrats, including in alignment on core policy priorities. When companies are cross-pressured, leaders perceive the company as leaning toward the Democrats. The potential decoupling of business from the Republican coalition represents one of the most significant changes in American politics in decades.
Are women legislators punished for not supporting women’s substantive policy interests? We test these gendered expectations. We marshal an original content analysis of cable news coverage and two survey experiments testing voters’ assessment of hypothetical legislators on the issues of abortion and equal pay. We find that voters rate both women and men legislators positively for supporting women’s issues and negatively evaluate legislators of both genders when they do not support women’s interests. We also find that women voters negatively evaluate women legislators who act against women’s interests at a greater rate than men voters. While we do not find evidence of voters holding women legislators to gendered expectations, we do find that legislators, regardless of their gender, have strategic incentives to promote women’s substantive representation. Our results suggest that voters care more about the substantive representation of women’s political interests than who supports those interests.
Overt political retribution, typically considered outside the bounds of American democracy, has recently risen to the surface of American political discourse. How do voters respond to elected officials wielding their powers of office for retributive purposes? In the current partisan political climate, do voters’ views of retribution depend on whether the official is a member of their party? Politicians in both parties have demonstrated willingness to threaten or pursue retaliation against corporations for using their political voice to publicly express opposition. Due to the American public’s ambivalence about the role of business in politics and the rights of corporations to political speech, the scenario of corporate political speech provides a useful case in which to test for partisan acceptance of the use of political retaliation. In an original and replication experiment, we find strong bipartisan rebuke of an elected official’s employment of “abusive legalism” in response to corporate political criticism. Strikingly, the negative consequences are greatest for an in-party official. The drop in support suffered by the official is equivalent to the effect of partisanship, such that an in-party official using their powers of office to “keep business out of politics” is viewed as unfavorably as a non-responsive out-party official.
This paper introduces a simple approach for assessing which survey questions are more likely to elicit political identity-influenced responses. We use daily data from Gallup to test which survey self-reports exhibit more or less susceptibility to politicization, finding the highest likelihood of politicization for societal-level questions. Conversely, we show that self-reported assessments of personal finances are less sensitive to partisan motivated responding. We also show how egotropic economic evaluations are influenced by the presence of other items on the same survey. Taken together, our results uncover scope conditions for how to interpret self-reported views of the economy, and we argue that measures of public opinion which have not yet been strongly politicized are better proxies for capturing the underlying welfare of the public.
Narratives and studies of Latino partisanship often emphasize Democratic identification, but some have recently suggested a shift towards Republicans. We address these by examining Latino party identification over a 34-year period, leveraging 35 national surveys with a total of over 103,000 Latino respondents along with Census data to create post-stratified survey weights to correct for biases. We emphasize changing partisanship over time by nativity, birth cohorts, and by national origin. From 2000 to 2012, we observed a slight overall increase in Democratic identification and a decrease in Republican identification, but this was driven by foreign-born Latinos. After 2012, we see declining Democratic identification overall, greater Republican identification among foreign-born and older native-born Latinos, and accelerating Independent identification among native-born Millennial and Gen Z Latinos. These results show that generational turnover and differences by nativity challenge extant theories of Latino partisan change over time.
This chapter examines the constitutional role of parties and partisanship. We begin by sketching a conception of constitutionalism as a mechanism for finding an equilibrium between different social interests. Appealing as this ideal of moderation has long been for many, we highlight its limits as a basis for democracy and progressive change. A desirable constitutional model must make space for political conflict and immoderation, and as we go on to argue, partisans and the associations they form are an important foundation for this. The final section connects these observations to the contemporary political world, in particular to the state of parties today and to some of the misplaced anxieties about ‘polarisation’ they give rise to.
Which predispositions drive voters’ policy attitudes? This article tests the role of political values as a driver of attitudes relative to two commonly posited sources – partisanship and symbolic ideology. Past work has found correlations between values and issue attitudes, but these cross-sectional studies have limited causal purchases. I test the effects of traditionalist and egalitarian values on issue stances using six ANES and GSS panel surveys from 1992 to 2020. I find that values drive within-voter changes in policy attitudes under a variety of specifications. Additionally, values shape attitudes on emergent policies, which I test using the cases of welfare reform in the 1990s and transgender policies in the 2010s. In all models, values have as large or larger effects on attitudes as that of partisanship or ideology. I conclude that values are a core predisposition which voters employ to make sense of policy issues.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, the gap in age-adjusted mortality rates between people living in Republican and Democratic counties expanded; people in Democratic counties started living longer. This paper argues that political partisanship poses a direct problem for ameliorating these trends: trust and adherence in one’s personal doctor (including on non-COVID-19 related care) – once a non-partisan issue – now divides Democrats (more trustful) and Republicans (less trustful). We argue that this divide is largely a consequence of partisan conflict surrounding COVID-19 that spilled over and created a partisan cleavage in people’s trust in their own personal doctor. We then present experimental evidence that sharing a political background with your medical provider increases willingness to seek care. The doctor-patient relationship is essential for combating some of society’s most pressing problems; understanding how partisanship shapes this relationship is vital.
In this research, we examine redistricting plan review by state supreme courts to determine what factors influence party-aligned voting in judicial decisions. We analyze whether judicial selection systems matter, as well as the ideological extremism of judges. Our judge-level data includes votes on redistricting cases heard across the American states from 1961 to 2022. We find that judges who are ideologically extreme are more likely to cast party-aligned votes, but only when selected by appointment with life tenure or by partisan elections.
Ideological polarization between political parties is essential for meaningful electoral competition, but at its extreme can strain democratic functioning. Despite a widespread recognition that multiple divides structure contemporary party polarization in Europe, its prevailing conceptualization and measurement remain one-dimensional. To resolve this tension, we introduce a novel, multidimensional approach to party polarization. Our main focus is on whether different ideological divides reinforce or crosscut each other. We calculate the effective dimensionality of a policy space using the correlation matrix of parties’ positions, which accounts for how the dimensions interrelate. Using both artificial data and positional estimates from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (1999–2019), we highlight the advantages of our approach and demonstrate that it is better able to capture the relationship between party polarization and mass partisanship. This study has important theoretical, methodological, and empirical implications for our understanding of polarization and democratic representation in a changing political landscape.
In We Choose You, Julian J. Wamble investigates the sophisticated process of Black voter candidate selection. Contrary to the common assumption that Black voters will support Black politicians, Wamble explores what considerations, outside of race, partisanship, and gender, Black voters use to choose certain representatives over others. The book complicates our view of candidate selection, expands our understanding of identity's role in the representative-constituent paradigm, and provides a framework through which scholars can determine a candidates preferability for other identity groups. Wamble uses original experimental tests on Black respondents to prove that Black voters prefer a politician, regardless of race, who shows a commitment to prioritizing the racial group's interest through personal sacrifice. Novel and timely, this book makes an important contribution to our understanding of Black political behavior and will only gain salience as the significance of the Black vote increases in upcoming elections.
Legislative term limits garnered public support because they promised to drain the swamp, removing entrenched incumbents from office. There is often a partisan dimension to this appeal since “the swamp” that is to be “drained” has often been controlled by one party for a lengthy period. However, it remains unclear to what extent term limits realign partisanship within US state legislatures. Using newly available turnover data, this research evaluates how legislative partisanship shifted after the implementation of term limits in state legislatures and continued over 20 years. The initial surge effects of term limits did appear to level the playing field between parties. The passage of term limits reversed party majorities in state legislatures, primarily benefiting newfound Republican majorities. These findings have important implications for current understandings of legislative term limits, as more states revisit these proposals, and provide insight into party trends at the state legislative level.